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 A B S T R A C T  
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of Corporate Governance on 
Intellectual Capital Disclosure. The sample used in this study consisted of 22 
banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2015-2019. The data 
used is in the form of an annual report. The sampling technique in this study was 
to use purposive sampling. This study uses multiple regression analysis. The 
statistical analysis results show that partially the audit committee and external 
auditor variables have a significant positive effect on intellectual capital 
disclosure. 
Meanwhile, the independent commissioner variable has no significant effect on 
intellectual capital disclosure. The ownership concentration variable harms 
intellectual capital disclosure. Simultaneously, the variables of the independent 
commissioner, ownership concentration, audit committee, and external auditor 
have a significant effect on intellectual capital disclosure.  
 Keywords: Independent Commissioner, Ownership Concentration, Audit Committee, External Auditor 
and Intellectual Capital Disclosure 
 
Introduction 
Corporate governance includes a series of relationships 
between company management, the board of commissioners, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders. The structures and 
mechanisms in corporate governance can be used to monitor 
fraudulent corporate management actions. Companies that apply 
the principles of good corporate governance in their business 
activities will be more transparent and responsible in providing 
information that complies with existing regulations or laws and 
information that is material and relevant to the interests of 
stakeholders. One of the vital pieces of information needed by 
stakeholders is information about intellectual capital. 
The importance of intellectual capital in Indonesia has 
grown with PSAK No.19 (revised 2000) on intangible assets. The 
PSAK does not explain in detail about Intellectual Capital, but at 
least the Intellectual Capital has received attention with the 
issuance of this PSAK. According to PSAK No. 19, intangible 
assets are non-monetary assets that can be identified and do not 
have a physical form and are owned for use in producing or 
delivering goods or services, leased to other parties, or 
administrative purposes (IAI, 2002). 
Examples of intangible assets according to PSAK No. 19 
Paragraph 9 include science and technology, design and 
implementation of new systems or processes, licenses, 
intellectual property rights, knowledge of markets, and 
trademarks (including product brands/brand names). Besides, 
computer software, patents, copyrights, live film, customer lists, 
forest concession rights, import quotas, franchises, supplier or 
customer relationships, customer loyalty, marketing rights, and 
market share are also added (Ulum, 2009). 
Following the latest company law, companies in the form 
of limited liability Companies (PT) and registered on the IDX are 
required to comply with Law No. 40 of 2007, and disclosure of 
intellectual capital is one of the types of information needed by 
users to determine the condition of the company in terms of 
mastery of science and technology (Wiliam, 2000; in Purnomisidhi, 
2005). 
The practice and disclosure of intellectual capital 
information is a logical consequence of implementing the 
concept of good corporate governance, which states that 
companies need to pay attention to stakeholder interests by 
establishing active cooperation following regulations. Thus, the 
company gets benefits, namely being able to maintain and 
maintain the company's long-term viability (Fitriani, 2012; 
Alizadeh, 2014; Hidalgo, 2011; Tulung, 2019; Dalwai, 2018). 
Literature Review 
2.1. Agency Theory 
The agency theory developed by Johnson (as cited in 
Daniri, 2006) states that company management as agents for 
shareholders will act with full awareness of their interests, not as 
wise and wise and fair parties. Towards shareholders as assumed 
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theory views that management cannot be trusted to act in the best 
possible way for the public interest in general and shareholders 
in particular. Based on this understanding, it can also be 
explained that agency theory is a theory that views company 
management as parties who have interests for shareholders. They 
will act for their interests consciously and not as parties who are 
wise and wise and fair to shareholders. 
2.2. Stakeholder Theory 
According to Daniri (2009), stakeholder theory 
emphasizes management's importance to coordinate with all 
parties involved in the company. Management is required to 
balance the interests of both shareholders and stakeholders as 
well as between stakeholders. This is to avoid conflicts of 
interest. 
Stakeholder theory states that company management is 
expected to carry out activities desired by stakeholders and report 
them to stakeholders (Purnomoshidi, 2005). For this reason, the 
company is expected to carry out responsible programs related to 
the management of company resources, primarily Intellectual 
Capital. 
The main objective of stakeholder theory is to help 
corporate managers understand their stakeholder environment 
and manage more effectively among their company's existing 
relationships. However, the broader aim of stakeholder theory is 
to assist corporate managers in increasing the value of their 
activities and minimizing losses to stakeholders. The core of the 
whole stakeholder theory lies in what will happen when the 
corporation and stakeholders lie in what will occur when the 
corporation and stakeholders carry out their relationship (Ulum, 
2009). 
2.3. Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy is a psychological condition of taking sides 
of people and groups of people who are very sensitive to their 
surrounding environment symptoms, both physical and non-
physical (Hadi, 2011, p. 87). According to O'Donovan, 2002 
(Hadi, 2011, p. 87) argues that organizational legitimacy can be 
seen as something that society gives to companies and something 
that companies want or seek from the community. Thus, 
legitimacy is a potential benefit or resource for the company to 
survive (going concern). 
Gray et al., (1996) argue that legitimacy is a ". . .. a 
system-oriented view of organization and society. . . permits us 
to focus on the role of information and disclosure in the 
relationship between organizations, the state, individuals, and 
group ". 
This definition implies that legitimacy is a company 
management system oriented towards taking sides with the 
community (society), individual government, and community 
groups. Therefore, as a system that prioritizes society's side, the 
company's operations must be congruent with the community's 
expectations. 
Legitimacy theory is closely related to reporting on 
intellectual capital and is also closely related to using the content 
analysis method as a measure of the reporting. Companies are 
more likely to report their Intellectual Capital if they have a 
particular need to do so. This may occur when the company finds 
that the company is unable to legitimize its status based on 
tangible assets, which are generally recognized as a symbol of 
company success (Ulum, 2009). 
2.4. Independent Commissioner 
According to the Limited Liability Company Law No. 40 of 
2007, states that independent commissioners have been adopted, 
namely in article 120 paragraph (1) and paragraph (2), notes: 
1. The association's articles may stipulate 1 (one) or more 
independent commissioners and 1 (one)  
2. principal commissioner. 
3. As referred to in paragraph (1), the independent 
commissioner is appointed based on the GMS's 
resolution from a party that is not affiliated with the main 
shareholder, a member of the Board of Directors, and 
other members of the Board of Commissioners. 
In the explanation of Article 120 paragraph (2) of the 
Company Law, it explains that: 
"Independent Commissioners in the code of good 
corporate governance are Commissioners from outside parties. 
Thus, an independent commissioner is a member of the board of 
commissioners who are not affiliated with the board of directors, 
other members of the board of commissioners, and controlling 
shareholder, and is free from business or other relationships that 
may affect his ability to act independently or act solely for the 
benefit of the Company (Surya, 2006). 
2.5. Ownership Concentration 
 In a company, the ownership structure will influence the 
motivation to supervise and monitor the management fiber 
company and its board of directors. Ownership concentration can 
occur due to differences in the proportion of share ownership 
listed on the IDX. So that from this difference, there are also 
differences in voting rights between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders. The resulting difference from the 
proportion of share ownership also results in an initial conflict of 
interest within or outside the company. Ownership can be 
concentrated if most of the shares are owned by some individuals 
or groups so that these shareholders have a relatively large 
number of shares than other shareholders. Meanwhile, ownership 
is diversified if many shareholders own the company with the 
same number of shares (Yustiana, 2014). 
2.6. Audit Committee 
  The audit committee is a committee under the board of 
commissioners, consisting of at least one independent 
commissioner and independent professionals from outside the 
company, whose responsibilities include helping auditors remain 
separate from management. In addition to the requirements of 
Bapepam-LK, audit committees are also needed in SOEs and 
banks. Most audit committees consist of three and sometimes five 
to seven members who are not part of company management 
(Elder et al., 2011). 
2.7. External Auditor 
A business dictionary external audit is defined as an audit 
conducted by an external (independent) body that meets the 
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things, whether the accounting records are accurate and 
complete, whether they are prepared following the provisions of 
PSAK, and whether the reports prepared from the data present 
the financial position and results of financial operations fairly. 
2.8. Intellectual Capital 
Interest in intellectual capital started when Tom Stewart, 
in June 1991, wrote an article (“Brain Power-How Intellectual 
Capital is Becoming America's Intellectual Capital's Most 
Valuable Assets”), which put intellectual capital on the 
management plan. Stewart defines intellectual capital in his 
article as follows: "The sum of everything everybody in your 
company knows that gives you a competitive edge in the 
marketplace. It is intellectual material knowledge, information, 
intellectual property, an experience that can be put to use to create 
wealth. Intellectual capital is generally identified as the 
difference between a company's market value (the company's 
business) and the book value of the company's assets or its 
financial capital. This is based on an observation that since the 
late 1980s, most businesses' market value and specifically 
knowledge-based businesses have become greater than the value 
reported in financial statements based on calculations made by 
accountants Roslender and Fincham 2004 (in Ulum, 2009). So 
intellectual capital is knowledge, information, experience, 
capabilities, and competencies that can provide added value to 
the company in improving company performance so that profits 
can increase. 
2.9 Components of Intellectual Capital 
From several definitions of intellectual capital, other 
researchers develop more specific components of intellectual 
capital. According to Edvinsson and Malone 1997 (Ulum, 2009, 
p. 25) classifies that the value of intellectual capital in a company 
is the sum of the Company's Human Capital and Structural 
Capital. Meanwhile, IFAC (1998) classified intellectual capital 
into three categories: organizational capital, relational capital, 
and human capital. Other researchers such as Bontis et al. (2000) 
stated that in general, all researchers who classify intellectual 
capital identify it into three main categories, namely: human 
capital, structural capital, and customer capital. 
Human capital is a combination of genetic inheritance, 
education, experience, and attitude about life and business. SC 
includes all non-human storehouses of knowledge in the 
organization. This includes databases, organizational charts, 
process manuals, strategies, routines, and anything else that 
makes the company value more than its material value. Whereas 
customer capital is the knowledge inherent in marketing channels 
and customer relationships, companies can develop it in business 
activities (Bontis et al., 2000, as cited in Ulum, 2009, p. 30). 
2.10. Measurement of Intellectual Capital 
If the company wants to increase company value, the 
company must think about what factors provide firm value 
information. Traditional business success indicators do not 
provide sufficient information about business success that can 
create value for the company. Another factor that companies 
must consider is intangible assets because, after all, these factors 
can affect the company's overall performance. Therefore, it is 
necessary to measure the intangible assets implied by the 
intellectual capital. Various methods have been offered to 
measure Intellectual Capital. One of them is the method 
developed by Pulic (1997). Produced by Public in 1997, which is 
designed to present information about the value creation 
efficiency of tangible assets and intangible assets owned by the 
company is an instrument to measure the performance of a 
company's intellectual capital. This approach is relatively easy 
and possible because it is constructed from the accounts in the 
company's financial statements (balance sheet, profit, and loss) 
(Ulum 2009b). 
In summary, the formulations and stages of the 
calculation are as follows: 
The first stage, Calculating the Value Added (VA), is 
calculated using a formula 
VA = OUT-IN 
Where: OUT (Output) = total sales and other income 
IN (Input) = selling expenses and additional costs (other than 
employee expenses) 
The second stage, Calculating the Value Added Capital 
Employed (VACA, the ratio of VA to CE), this indicator is used 
for VA created by one unit of Physical Capital. This ratio shows 
the contribution made by each company of CE to the 
organization's Value Added. 
VACA = VA / CE 
Where: VA = Value Added 
 CE = Capital Employed: available funds (equity, net income) 
The third stage, calculating the value-added human 
capital (VAHU, the ratio of VA to Intellectual Capital), this 
indicator shows how much VA can be generated with the funds 
spent on labor. This ratio shows the contribution made by each 
rupiah invested in HC to the organization's Value Added. 
VAHU = VA / HC 
Where: HC = Human Capital: employee expenses 
In the fourth stage, calculating structural capital value-
added (STVA), this indicator's ratio measures the amount of SC 
needed to produce 1 rupiah from VA and indicates how 
successful SC is in value creation. 
STVA = SC / VA 
Where: SC = Structural Capital: VA-HC 
VA = Value Added 
The fifth stage, calculating the value-added intellectual 
coeffective capitalist (VAICTM). VICTIM indicates that an 
organization's intellectual ability can also be considered a BPI 
(Business Performance Indicator). 
〖VAIC〗^ TM = VACA + VAHU + STVA 
This method has the advantage that the required data is 
relatively easy to obtain from various companies' sources and 
types (Pulic, 1997, in Ulum, 2009). 
2.11. Interaction Between Variables 
The Influence of Independent Commissioners on 
Intellectual Capital Disclosure 
According to Haniffa and Cook (2002), the more the 
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the impact of the information disclosed. And with the 
characteristics of an independent Independent Commissioner 
who is independent (not tied to any relationship with the 
company) will decide on the independent commissioner who 
does not favor any of the company's interests. Although 
disclosure of intangible assets is still only voluntary, it is hoped 
that the disclosure of information regarding intangible assets 
(which includes intellectual capital) can be disclosed more 
specifically. 
The Effect of Ownership Concentration on Intellectual 
Capital Disclosure 
Companies with limited ownership are expected to have 
less information asymmetry between management and majority 
shareholders who generally have access to the information they 
need and can provide an active governance system that is difficult 
for smaller, more passive, and less-informed investors (Cormier 
et al. in Li et al., 2008). According to their wants and needs, large 
ownership can create a more significant moral hazard by 
exploring company-owned resources, including human 
resources. 
The Effect of the Audit Committee on Intellectual 
Capital Disclosure 
Li et al. (2008) stated that the larger the size of the audit 
committee in a company is expected to have a more significant 
influence in regulating the disclosure of intellectual capital 
practices (as quoted in Wahyuni and Rasmini, 2016). The audit 
committee also has the responsibility to supervise the reporting 
and disclosure of information in the financial statements. The 
audit committee can oversee and disclose information about 
intangible assets (including intellectual capital) because overall, 
the Intellectual Capital component can improve company 
performance and indirectly attract investors. 
The Effect of External Auditor Quality on Intellectual 
Capital Disclosure 
According to Kompasiana, 2015, the external auditor is 
a third-party alias not part of the organization. They perform 
assignments based on contracts governed by statutory provisions 
and professional standards that apply to external auditors. 
External auditors focus on the accuracy and understanding of 
historical events reflected in the organization's financial 
statements. 
The external auditor is one of the determinants of the 
quality of disclosure reports made by the company. This external 
auditor's existence for guarantees that the reports prepared by the 
company are presented fairly. External auditors included in the 
Big-Four can be used to reference that the external auditors are 
qualified and have a better reputation to produce accurate, 
independent auditor reports. According to Barako (2007), 
although management's overall responsibility is to prepare 
company reports, external auditors can significantly influence the 
amount of information disclosed. 
2.12. Research Framework  
 
 
Figure 1. Research Framework 
 
2.13. Hypothesis 
H1: The Independent Commissioner has a positive effect on 
Intellectual Capital disclosure 
H2: Ownership concentration has a positive effect on Intellectual 
Capital disclosure 
H3: The Audit Committee has a positive effect on intellectual 
capital disclosure 
H4: External Auditor Quality has a positive effect on Intellectual 
Capital disclosure 
H5: Independent commissioners, ownership concentration, audit 
committee, and external auditors affect Intellectual Capital 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
Descriptive statistical analysis is used to present 
information related to the characteristics of the required variables 
in the form of maximum values, minimum values, mean, and 
standard deviation. The mean is used to measure the central 
importance of data distribution. Simultaneously, the standard 
deviation is the difference in the value of the data under study and 












International Journal of Business and Social Science Research 
 
 
Vol: 2, Issue: 4 
April/2021 
https://ijbssrnet.com/index.php/ijbssr 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.47742/ijbssr.v2n4p1   
©The Institute of Academic Research and Publication                                                                                          http://iarpnet.org/  
Table 1. Test Results Statistik Descriptif 
Decription  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Deviation 
KI 110 0,500 0,800 0,57127 0,079034 
KK 110 0,154 1,000 0,54841 0,205341 
JR 110 3,0 38,0 13,055 8,1543 
AE 110 0,0 1,0 0,782 0,4149 
IC 110 0,453 0,766 0,62415 0,64955 
 
Based on the calculation of the descriptive analysis found in 
table 9, it can be explained as follows: 
1. The variable KI (Independent Commissioner, XI) has a 
minimum value of 0.5, a maximum value of 0.8, and a mean 
of 0.57127 with a standard deviation of 0.079034. 
2. In the variable KK (Ownership Concentration, X2) has a 
minimum value of 0.154, a maximum value of 1.00, and a 
mean of 0.54841 with a standard deviation of 0.205341. 
3. In the JR variable (Audit Committee has, X3), which is a 
proxy for the audit committee, it has a minimum value of 3.0, 
a maximum value of 38.0, and a mean of 13.055 with a 
standard deviation of 8.1543. 
4. The variable AE (External Auditor, X4) has a minimum 
value of 0.0, a maximum value of 1.0, and a mean of 0.782 
with a standard deviation of 0.4149. 
5. The IC (Intellectual Capital, Y) variable has a minimum 
value of 0.453, a maximum value of 0.766 and a mean of 
0.62415 with a standard deviation of 0.064955. 
The standard deviation value shows how far the data 
variation is, if the normal deviation value is greater than the mean 
value, it means that the result is not excellent or heterogeneous. 
Based on the descriptive analysis results above, the mean value 
for each variable is greater than the standard deviation. So it can 
be concluded that the variables X1, X2, X3, X4, and Y do not 
occur homogeneously, which means that the data differences 
between companies are relatively small.
 




KI 0,922 1,085 
KK 0,796 1,256 
JR 0,843 1,186 
AE 0,783 1,277 
 
Classic Assumption Test 
This classic assumption test consists of the normality 
test, heteroscedasticity test, multi-correlation test, linearity test, 
and autocorrelation test. 
1. Normality test 
The normality test aims to test whether confounding or 
residual variables have a normal distribution in the regression 
model. The normality test was carried out using the One-Sample 
Kolmogorov Smirnov test at the residual unstandardized value 
using an alpha of 5%. If the value of asymptotic significance> 
0.05, the data is normally distributed. The normality test shows 
that the value is the asymptotic significance (0.071)> 0.05, so it 
can be concluded that the data are normally distributed. 
2. Multicollinearity Test 
Data is said to be free from multicollinearity symptoms 
if the value of VIF is smaller than 10. The following are the 
results of the Multicollinearity test with the VIF value. The test 
results are presented in Table 2, the independent tolerance 
variable value (0.922; 0.796; 0.843; 0.783) is greater than 0.1. 
Meanwhile, the VIF value of the independent variable (1.085; 
1.256; 1.186; 1.277) is less than 10. From these results, it is 
concluded that there is no multicollinearity in this regression 
model to be used in research. 
3. Heteroscedasticity test 
Based on this, it can be seen that the dots spread 
randomly both above and below the 0 on the Y-axis and the 
spread does not form a certain pattern. This shows that this model 
is free from heteroscedasticity. So that this model fulfills the 
heteroscedasticity assumption. 
4. Autocorrelation Test 
The autocorrelation test aims to test whether in the linear 
regression model there is a correlation between confounding 
error in period t and confounding error in period t-1 (previous). 
The autocorrelation test used is the Run Test. It can be seen in 
Appendix 3 that the Asymp. Sig (1-tailed) of 0.125> 0.05 so there 
is no autocorrelation symptom. 
Hypothesis Test 
a. Simultaneous Test 
The hypothesis proposed is as follows: 
H0= Independent commissioner, ownership concentration, audit 
committee, and external auditors do not affect intellectual capital. 
H5= Independent commissioner, ownership concentration, audit 
committee, and external auditors affect Intellectual Capital 
The F statistical test shows whether all the independent 
or free variables included in the model have a joint influence on 
the dependent variable. Based on the Simultaneous test, it is 
known that the F-count value of 3.790 is greater than the F-table 
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H0 is rejected and H5 is accepted, so it can be concluded that the 
variables of the independent commissioner, ownership 
concentration, audit committee, and external auditor jointly or 
simultaneously influence the variable intellectual capital 
disclosure. 
b. Partial Test 
 
The t statistical test shows how far the influence of one 
independent explanatory variable individually in explaining the 
variation of the dependent variable. The following are the 
regression results from the t-test with the previously created 
equation.
 
Table 3. Table Test Parsial (t) 
No Variable B Beta t Sig 
1 (Contant) ,575  10,903 ,000 
2 KI ,056 ,068 ,716 ,475 
3 KK -,064 -,201 -1,964 ,052 
4 JR ,002 ,261 2,624 ,010 
5 AE ,032 ,205 1,988 ,049 
 
              
           Based on the results of regression testing, the following 
regression formula can be drawn up: 
 Y = 0.575 + 0.056x_1-0.064x_2 + 0.002x_3 + 0.032x_4 
           This equation can be interpreted as follows: 
          A constant of 0, 575 states that if the independent variable 
is considered constant, then the average Intellectual Capital 
disclosure is high, namely 57%. 
          The regression coefficient on the Independent 
Commissioner variable is 0.056. A positive coefficient value 
indicates that the Independent Commissioner has a positive effect 
on Intellectual Capital Disclosure. 
          The regression coefficient on the ownership concentration 
variable is -0.064. The negative coefficient value indicates that 
ownership concentration harms intellectual capital disclosure. 
           The regression coefficient on the Audit Committee 
variable is 0.002. A positive coefficient value indicates that the 
Audit Committee has a positive effect on Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure. 
           The regression coefficient on the External Auditor 
variable is 0.032. A positive coefficient value indicates that the 
External Auditor has a positive effect on Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure. 
        Then from the regression equation, the hypothesis testing 
can be done as follows: 
        1. Effect of Independent Commissioners on Intellectual 
Capital Disclosure. 
        The hypothesis proposed is as follows: 
H0=Independent Commissioner has no positive effect on 
disclosure of Intellectual Capital. 
H1=Independent Commissioner has a positive effect on 
Intellectual Capital disclosure. 
         Based on table 11, it is known that the significance level is 
0.475> 0.05, and the count value is smaller than the t table (0.716 
<1.65936) so that this means that H0 is accepted and H1 is 
rejected. So, the Independent Commissioner does not have a 
significant effect on Intellectual Capital. And the beta value of 
0.068 indicates that the Independent Commissioner variable on 
Intellectual Capital disclosure is 6.8%. And this influence is 
positive so that if the number of Independent Commissioners in 
a company increases, it will increase Intellectual Capital 
disclosures. 
        2. The Effect of Ownership Concentration on Intellectual 
Capital Disclosure. 
         The hypothesis proposed is as follows: 
H0 = Ownership concentration does not have a positive effect on 
disclosure of intellectual capital. 
H2 =Ownership concentration has a positive effect on Intellectual 
Capital disclosure. 
         Based on table 11, it is known that the significance level is 
0.052> 0.05 and the count value is smaller than the t table (-1.964 
<1.65936), so that this means that H0 is accepted and H2 is 
rejected. So, the Independent Commissioner does not have a 
significant effect on Intellectual Capital. And the beta value of -
0.201 indicates that the Independent Commissioner variable's 
influence on the disclosure of Intellectual Capital is -20.1%. And 
this effect is negative, which means that the greater the 
concentration of ownership of an individual or group of an entity, 
the lower the disclosure of intellectual capital is. 
         3.The Effect of the Audit Committee on Intellectual 
Capital Disclosure. 
        The hypothesis proposed is as follows: 
H0 = Audit Committee has no positive effect on intellectual 
capital disclosure. 
H4 = The Audit Committee has a positive effect on intellectual 
capital disclosure. 
          Based on table 11, it is known that the level of significance 
is 0.010> 0, 05 and the value of t is more significant than t table 
(1.988> 1.65936) so that this means that H0 is rejected and H4 is 
accepted. So, the Audit Committee has a significant effect on 
Intellectual Capital. And the beta value of 0.261 indicates that the 
Audit Committee variable's influence on Intellectual Capital 
disclosure is 26.1%. And this influence is positive so that if the 
size of the Audit Committee (proxied by the number of meetings) 
increases, it will increase the number of Intellectual Capital 
disclosures. 
          4.The Effect of External Auditors on Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure 
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H0 = External Auditor has no positive effect on Intellectual 
Capital disclosure. 
H3 = External Auditor has a positive effect on Intellectual Capital 
disclosure 
         Based on table 11, it is known that the level of significance 
is 0.049> 0.05 and the value of t is greater than t table (2.624> 
1.65936) so that this means that H0 is rejected and H3 is accepted. 
So, the Audit Committee has a significant effect on Intellectual 
Capital. And the beta value of 0.205 indicates that the External 
Auditor variable's influence on the disclosure of Intellectual 
Capital is 20.5%. And this influence is positive so that if an entity 
uses a qualified External Auditor, it will affect the quality of the 
company's information disclosure, including Intellectual 
Capital's disclosure. 
           Determination Coefficient Test 
          The coefficient of determination (R2), in essence, 
measures how far the model's ability to explain the variation in 
the dependent variable. The coefficient of determination is 
between zero and one. The small value of R2 means that the 
independent variables' ability to explain the variation in the 
dependent variable is minimal. A value close to 1 (one) means 
that the independent variables provide almost all the information 
needed to predict the dependent variable's variation. 
          Based on the results of regression testing, it was found that 
the coefficient of determination (R2) was 12.6% (can be seen in 
appendix 4). These results can be concluded that the independent 
variable influences intellectual capital disclosure by 12.6%. 
Simultaneously, the remaining 87.4% is influenced by other 
variables outside the variables described in this study. 
Discussion 
            The effect of the Independent Commissioner on 
Intellectual Capital disclosure 
          The Independent Commissioner variable does not affect 
disclosure of Intellectual Capital (ICD). The partial test results 
show that the t-count value is smaller than the t-table (0.716 
<1.65936), and the significance level is greater than the 
probability value of 0.475> 0.05. And the regression coefficient 
value is 0.056, indicating that if the number of independent 
commissioners is one value, disclosure of the dependent variable 
(ICD) will increase by 0.056. This test rejects H1, which states 
that the Independent Commissioner variable positively affects the 
disclosure of Intellectual Capital (ICD). 
             These results support the agency theory, which states that 
company management as an agent for shareholders will act 
according to their own will, not be fair to all shareholders. So it 
indicates that the more significant the proportion of Independent 
Commissioners is not necessarily able to understand and 
represent the interests of minority shares and all company 
stakeholders so that the functions of internal control and control 
at the top level do not work correctly. This study's results 
contradict research by Wahyuni and Rasmini (2016) and White 
et al. (2007), which stated that independent commissioners had a 
positive effect on disclosure of Intellectual Capital. However, the 
results of this analysis are supported by research conducted by 
Ho and Wong (2001), Khomsiyah (2003), Arifah (2012), and 
Zulkarnaen and Mahmud (2013), which state that Independent 
Commissioners do not affect information disclosure. This 
supports the explanation that independent commissioners' 
ineffective function in companies as a monitoring tool is because 
the appointment of Independent Commissioners is only to fulfill 
corporate governance rules, not to enforce corporate governance. 
The existence of independent commissioners in the company is 
quite essential, but if it is not balanced with an increase in 
performance, it will not impact company performance. 
             Effect of Ownership Concentration on Intellectual 
Capital disclosure 
             The ownership concentration variable does not affect 
disclosure of Intellectual Capital (ICD). The partial test results 
show that the value of the t-count is smaller than the t table (-
1.964 <1.65936), and the significance level is greater than the 
probability value of 0.052> 0.05. And the value of the regression 
coefficient is -0.064, indicating that if the number of ownership 
concentrations increases by one value, the dependent variable 
disclosure (ICD) will decrease by -0.064. This test rejects H2, 
which states that the ownership concentration variable has a 
positive effect on Intellectual Capital's exposure (ICD). 
           This result contradicts the stakeholder theory, which states 
that management must balance both shareholder's and 
stakeholders' interests. The possibility of information 
assimilation is very large because large shareowners will have 
unilateral information that the other party may not know. The 
emergence of moral hazard on ownership with a high 
concentration will also use the information they have to carry on 
a potential business without providing information to other 
parties. Another reason that shows that ownership concentration 
does not affect disclosure of intellectual capital is that high 
concentration can lead to policies or a unilateral decision due to 
voting rights in the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) so 
that the results achieved are not optimal, company policies are 
ineffective and the achievement of company goals is not good. 
So, the company's governance is not optimal so that 
automatically intellectual capital is not widely disclosed 
(Nugroho, 2012). This study's results are different from those of 
Bukh (2005) and Ulum (2015), which state that ownership 
concentration influences disclosure of intellectual capital.             
However, this study's results are supported by White et al. (2007) 
and Nugroho (2012), which states that ownership concentration 
does not affect disclosure of intellectual capital. Significant 
ownership can lead to more significant moral hazards by 
exploring resources. owned by the company, including human 
resources according to the wants and needs of the brand 
              The Effect of the Audit Committee on Intellectual 
Capital Disclosure 
               The Audit Committee variable affects the disclosure of 
Intellectual Capital (ICD). This is evidenced by the regression 
testing results, which can be seen from the coefficients table 
(attachment 4). The partial test results show that the t count value 
is greater than the t-table (1.988> 1.65936) and the significance 
level is greater than the probability value of 0.010> 0, 05. 










International Journal of Business and Social Science Research 
 
 
Vol: 2, Issue: 4 
April/2021 
https://ijbssrnet.com/index.php/ijbssr 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.47742/ijbssr.v2n4p1   
©The Institute of Academic Research and Publication                                                                                          http://iarpnet.org/  
which states that the Audit Committee variable has a positive 
effect on disclosure of Intellectual Capital (ICD). 
              The results of the analysis are supported by the theory of 
legitimacy, which states that the company's management system 
is oriented towards taking sides with the community, individual 
government, and community groups. This is related to the duties 
of the audit committee related to reporting the findings of external 
auditors. Suaryana (2005) states that the audit committee is in 
charge of assisting the board of commissioners in monitoring the 
financial reporting process by management to increase financial 
reports' credibility. The audit committee's duties include 
reviewing accounting policies implemented by the company, 
assessing internal control, reviewing external reporting systems, 
and compliance with regulations. To carry out its duties, the audit 
committee should carry out formal communication between the 
board, management, external auditors, and internal auditors. 
Formal communication between the audit committee, internal 
auditors, and external auditors will ensure that the internal and 
external audit processes are carried out correctly. 
           Arifah (2012) states that the audit committee influences 
the disclosure of relevant information values. IC disclosure is one 
of them. Likewise, Taliyang's (2011) 's analysis states that only 
the number of audit committee meetings positively affects the 
three corporate governance variables. In contrast, the other 
variables do not influence information disclosure (Intellectual 
Capital). The same results are also shown by Wahyuni and 
Rasmini (2016). However, different results are given by Fitriani 
(2012), Zulkarnaen and Mahmud (2013), and Ho and Wong 
(2001), who states that the audit committee does not influence the 
extent of intellectual capital disclosure contained in an annual 
report. 
              The Effect of External Auditors on Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure 
             The External Auditor variable affects the disclosure of 
Intellectual Capital (ICD). The partial test results show that the 
value of t is greater than the t-table (2.624> 1.65936) and the 
significance level is greater than the probability value of 0.049> 
0.05. And the value of the regression coefficient is 0.032, 
indicating that if the quality of external auditors increases by one 
value, the dependent variable disclosure (ICD) will increase by 
0.032. This test accepts H4, which states that the Audit 
Committee variable has a positive effect on disclosure of 
Intellectual Capital (ICD). 
              The analysis results are supported by the theory of 
legitimacy, which states that the company's management system 
is oriented towards taking sides with the community, individual 
government, and community groups. This proves that the 
External Auditor is one of the determinants of the disclosure of 
reports made by the company, including disclosure of Intellectual 
Capital. This external auditor's existence is to ensure that the 
reports prepared by the company are presented fairly. According 
to Barako (2007), although management's overall responsibility 
is to prepare company reports, external auditors can significantly 
influence the amount of information disclosed. Research 
conducted by Whiting and Woodcock (2009) supports that 
external auditors affect intellectual capital disclosure. 
Meanwhile, research conducted by Prameswari (2014) states that 
there is no influence between external auditors and disclosure of 
intellectual capital. 
CONCLUSION 
            This study examines how corporate governance's 
influence on intellectual capital disclosure in banking companies 
listed on the IDX in 2011-2015. The test was carried out by 
multiple regression analysis with four independent variables 
(Independent Commissioner, Ownership Concentration, Audit 
Committee, and External Auditor) and one dependent variable 
(Intellectual Capital disclosure). The results of the regression 
analysis show that Corporate Governance (as proxied by 
Independent Commissioners, Ownership Concentration, Audit 
Committee, and External Auditors) has a simultaneous effect on 
the disclosure of Intellectual Capital because the significance 
value is 0.006 <0.05 and the Fount value of 3.790 is more 
significant than F-table. They are amounting to 2.46. 
           Then for the partial test (T-test), the results obtained are 
that two variables are significant to Y. The first is that the audit 
committee has a positive effect on intellectual capital disclosure, 
this result is supported by legitimacy theory and because the level 
of significance is 0.010> 0, 05 and the value t count is greater 
than t table (1.988 <1.65936), so that H3 is accepted. The second 
is that the External Auditor has a positive effect on the disclosure 
of Intellectual Capital, the theory of legitimacy supports this 
result and because the level of significance is 0.049> 0.05 and the 
value of t is more significant than t table (2.624 <1.65936), so 
that H4 is accepted. While the Independent Commissioner 
variable does not affect disclosure of intellectual capital, this 
result is supported by agency theory and because the level of 
significance is 0.475> 0.05 and the count is smaller than the t-
table (0.716 <1.65936) so that H1 is rejected. And the ownership 
concentration variable does not affect disclosure of intellectual 
capital. This result is contrary to stakeholder theory and because 
the level of significance is 0.052> 0.05 and the t-count is smaller 
than the t-table (-1.964 <1.65936), so that H2 is rejected. So, the 
Corporate Governance that is implemented in the company has 
not been fully implemented properly. The reality often makes it 
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